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The writer is the regional security director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and co-editor of the newly released ‘Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics’

If there is a time to use superlatives about the affairs of the Middle East, it is the year 2024. The cascade of events that began in October 2023 is no reason to be dizzy. If the important mix of tragedies, surprises and strategic episodes takes time to resolve, what has already happened will undoubtedly have lasting effects.

The diverse and fragmented Levantine societies underwent many historical changes. In doing so, they are unlikely to find much outside help because of local reluctance and global fatigue. The reorganization of the region was accompanied by great violence and renewed competition.

Palestinians have experienced unprecedented suffering in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli military. The failed bloody bet of Hamas, and the inability of its partners to deliver, is a reminder, when needed, that the only path for Palestinian statehood is its internationalization and a negotiated outcome. The coalition for a two-state solution organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab states and European countries emerged as the most likely vehicle for this. The Palestinians must be convinced that this is more than a symbolic diplomatic dance but they must also show ownership of the process, something that a long-awaited reform of the Palestinian Authority can do. However, such aspirations remain exposed to Israeli hostility and the potential wrath of Donald Trump.

Similarly, Israeli society went from severe trauma to military victory in just one year. It reinforces the belief that Israel can only rely on its military might and that expansion into Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only justified but necessary. The unconditional support that Israel gets from the US and some European states allows it to reject the need for a fair peace that will provide security for all.

But this mindset of security alone has dire consequences. It is expensive, it increases confidence in the US, and it alienates current and would-be neighborhood partners, who fear that Israel will expand the conflict by hitting Iran’s leadership and nuclear facilities. The reputational losses of the war in Gaza are enormous and legal liabilities. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his radical allies seems as assured as the internal fractures in the nature of the state of Israel.

For the Lebanese, an opposite dynamic is at play. A hubristic Hizbollah must consider the collapse of military strategy, ideological narrative and overall credibility. Reviving its resistance ethos is a tall order given the need to lick its deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and the dire straits of its constituency. Many Lebanese who sensed an opportunity faced two opposing forces: they knew they would not get more chances to change their state but they also knew the danger of provocation. of a wounded Hizbollah, which could spark domestic strife.

More importantly, Syrians have their first taste of freedom after decades of oppression. The corruption of the Assad regime allowed for its rapid collapse, without the feared scenes of mass sectarian violence. However, the new Islamist administration in Damascus has shown restraint and some wisdom. Securing peace, however, requires many feats of magnanimity and dedication to inclusive governance despite internal and external detractors.

At the very least, Syrians can take pleasure in the fact that they are exposing the flaws in realpolitik. It is the ultimate irony that, a decade ago, most Arabs and western states wanted the Assad regime gone but Syrians were divided. By early December, many Arab and western states wanted Assad to stay but Syrians were largely united in imposing internal change. They need foreign goodwill. To achieve Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish moderation and US diplomacy are essential. To reassure the Alawite community, Russian mediation will help. Gulf states can help neutralize Iran’s influence.

Iran is the undeniable loser in all this. It has partnered with militias to increase its influence in fractured states and divided societies. It expects these groups to advance their interests, instead dragging them into the wars they started. Turkey exploits Tehran in Syria, the central geopolitical arena of the region.

Many of the capitals of the west will find comfort that until now, these changes in history have been in the strange. No major migration crisis, no protracted state-on-state war, no massive out-of-area terrorist attack, no ongoing impact on oil prices, no consequential global disruption trade. It is complacency that paves the way for unwanted surprises.